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A slumber did my spirit seal; 
         I had no human fears: 
She seemed a thing that could not feel 
         The touch of earthly years. 
No motion has she now, no force; 
         She neither hears nor sees; 
Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course, 
         With rocks, and stones, and trees.1 
There has been no shortage of debate on William Wordsworth’s “A slumber did my 
spirit seal” (1800) in the last century. From the biographically oriented readings of 
E. D. Hirsch (1960) and Richard E. Matlak (1978) to the psychoanalytically 
charged views of Geoffrey Hartman (1964) and J. Hillis Miller (1979) and the 
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pragmatically steered interpretation of Robert B. Meyers (1980), as well as 
linguistic experiments such as Steven Knapp and Walter Benn Michaels’s (1982) 
imaginary play on the poem, along with Peggy Kamuf’s (1986) and Marc 
Redfield’s (2011) critical responses to their experiment, and a wide variety of 
thematic readings, such as Pieter Vermeulen’s (2009) understanding of community 
inspired by the philosophy of Jean-Luc Nancy, “Slumber” has undergone many 
transformations.2 
My contribution to the discussion will take the form of dividing some of the 
most influential comments of the poem into two interpretive positions, shock 
readings and non-shock readings, and of responding to “Slumber” through the 
concept of intermedial experience and the rhetorical device of ekphrasis. 
Authorities in the shock position include F. W. Bateson (1950), Cleanth Brooks 
(1951), Brian G. Caraher (1991), and Richard Adelman (2011), and, in the non-
shock one, Hugh Sykes Davies (1965), Paul de Man (1983[1969]), and Charles 
Rzepka (2008). The two interpretive positions are relevant to a number of issues for 
which “Slumber” has frequently been analyzed in debates on Wordsworthian 
Romanticism, as well as to the discussion of narrative selves involved in the 
intermedial experience of poetry. 
My use and understanding of intermedial experience and ekphrasis continue 
those of my 2013 monograph The Intermedial Experience of Horror, as well more 
recent work on the concept of experience in both literary and media studies (2017a, 
2017b; Toikkanen and Virtanen 2018). The current field of intermediality research 
is wildly spread out in multiple directions, theoretical and practical (see Jensen; 
Rippl; Wolf; Rajewsky), and here my aim is neither to map the entire field nor to 
propose a new paradigm but to add to the options at the researcher’s disposal. 
3 
My focus is on intermedial experience rather than on intermediality 
understood as, for instance, configurations or transformations that take place 
between two forms of art or media formats such as literature, painting, and video 
games. For the purpose, the concept of medium must be revised to refer, in the first 
place, to the five senses on which awareness and perception are classically founded 
— sight, hearing, touch, smell, and taste (see Hill; Classen).3 When intermedial 
phenomena are grasped as rooted in this basic level, their experiential quality comes 
into full view and enables, within intermediality research, the study of experiences 
(and descriptions of experiences) that may be either real or imagined. What do 
readers see in their mind on reading literature, how do they experience the seeing, 
and how do they respond to the experiences described in the literature? The 
presenting medium of word turns into the visual medium and, in the process, affects 
the reader’s intermedial experience in a medium-specific manner. Indeed, reading 
engages the other senses too, and “Slumber” could be analyzed, for instance, in 
terms of its haptic imagery (“The touch of earthly years”) or its kinesthetic imagery 
(“Rolled round in earth’s diurnal course”). However, the visual is accented here 
because an experience of seeing between dream and reality arguably preoccupies 
the poem’s narrative self and spreads out. 
The way in which the words of “Slumber” can turn into visual images in the 
reader’s mind may emerge from the poem’s rhetorical design. To account for it, I 
shall focus on the device of ekphrasis. Ekphrasis has traditionally been familiar to 
scholars as poetry about paintings and, since the 1990s, first as the verbal 
representation of a visual representation (see Mitchell; Heffernan) and, second, as a 
figurative transposition shifting a representational element between any two media 
(see Clüver; Yacobi). As I have argued elsewhere, in contrast to other rhetorical 
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devices such as hypotyposis whose function it is to make readers “see words,” or to 
visualize the verbal, ekphrasis is charged with an interpretive demand.4 What is the 
meaning of the visual image produced by the words read, and how does the reader 
(or possibly the narrator of a literary text) go on to make sense of the image that is 
there to be not just seen but also interpreted?  
This article calls for a kind of visual reading that will not let the intermedial 
experience of poetry be reduced to an interpretive position. For even when such a 
position is not a fixed one, when it is sensitive to change from one reading to the 
next, each single interpretation consists of a narrative appropriation of the text by 
the reader. What does “Slumber” mean? Who is telling and/or writing the poem and 
how? What does the reader make of it? Who is the “I” at any point? Inevitable as 
such questions are, with each answer there always remains an excess of experience, 
something that is not part of the interpretation and cannot be exhausted by offering 
another. Becoming involved with the excess and reflecting on it will provide insight 
into how intermedial experience is constituted. In the readings of “Slumber,” it has 
consistently been the empty space between the poem’s two stanzas that has 
appeared to generate such excess. 
Images that readers have seen in reading the poem, the narrative they have 
used to describe them in their own words, as well as the effect of the empty space 
on their responses, point to an intermedial experience and to the kind of 
significance one tends to assign to the poem’s visual images. The images represent 
something — but what? Which narrative self is the source of their significance: the 
reader, the poetic I, or Wordsworth himself? What does the reading come to in 
terms of the selves involved? I argue that interpretive positions such as the “shock” 
and “non-shock” readings of “Slumber” can be viewed as ekphrases in which the 
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reader verbally describes the images of the poem with the consequence of narrative 
appropriation. In taking sides, in a manner reminiscent of Stanley Fish’s interpretive 
communities, the reading self reduces experience to an interpretive position, and so 
closes off the reading process subjectively into a private sphere that may or may not 
have public clout in the rhetorical contest between opposing sides. Studying the 
device of ekphrasis shows how reading as intermedial experience affected by empty 
space in “Slumber” both maintains and disrupts this sense of subjective closure. 
 
“Shock” and “Non-Shock” Readings 
As noted, readings of “Slumber” have frequently found the empty space between 
the poem’s two stanzas highly important – in terms of meaning as well as  textual 
detail. What is the relationship between the visual imagery in the first stanza 
(dreaming about a “thing”) and the visual imagery in the second stanza (observing 
“rocks, and stones, and trees”)? The “shock” readings (which do not necessarily 
agree with one another) can be identified through an emphasis on the gap as a 
transition from one experience to another between the two stanzas, whereas the 
“non-shock” readings (which may find themselves in agreement with some of the 
“shockreading” interpretations) regard the poem as an ongoing state of the mind 
that, the gap notwithstanding, conveys an uninterrupted experience.  
 
“Shock” 
Bateson’s and Brooks’s famous “shock” readings of the early 1950s, as accounted 
for by Hirsch, differ in their interpretations of the gap between the two stanzas. 
Whereas Bateson sees the poem’s ultimately “pantheistic magnificence,” Brooks 
feels the “lover’s agonized shock” at the “most powerful and horrible image” his 
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sight is confronted with at the end (Hirsch 471–72). Brooks explicitly affirms that 
the transition between the two stanzas creates a “shock,” but Bateson’s jubilant 
reading also emphasizes the gap as a transition from one experience to another — 
something important occurs in that empty space, one that shocks and transforms the 
intermedial experience. For Bateson, the transformation finally results in a positive 
reconciliation; for Brooks, the dream ends in agony and horror for the masculine 
poetic I.5 
The most extended case in support of the “shock” reading of “Slumber” 
must be Brian Caraher’s book-length study. His pragmatic approach to reading 
literature is one that, aware of its own activity, seeks “a closure to our experience 
when it achieves a distinct and self-sufficient character” (23). Caraher continues: 
“The closure is not of necessity always the end or result that one desires, nor is the 
course of an experience always pleasing” (23). Caraher, in other words, agrees with 
the above point on the similarity of Bateson’s and Brooks’s positions because both 
of them bring about closure, even if with different affective effects. He then 
proceeds to stake his own claim about Wordsworth as “a Romantic fantast at deadly 
play” (62) who, in “Slumber,” shocks our attempts to place the poem’s images in a 
definitive interpretive context. For Caraher, in the spirit of Deweyan pragmatics, the 
reader does well to step back, recall their contextual conditions in interpreting any 
literary text, and adjust to the shock. This is because “[c]ultures inscribe habitual 
selves within their structured fabrics” (236), and so it is the culture the reader 
inhabits that closes off the way in which a text can be experienced. Narrative selves 
vary from one reading to the next and are shocked by a cultural system that is put 
into place by those very selves seeking to recognize themselves in it. The poem 
becomes, in a manner of speaking, a reflection of the reader’s life situation 
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appropriated by its own cultural vagaries. As suggested by Bo Pettersson (), 
Caraher’s pragmatics can end up placing too much emphasis on readers reading 
themselves. 
The difference between Caraher’s reading of “Slumber” and those of 
Bateson and Brooks is his acceptance of a textual detail originally pointed out by 
Hugh Sykes Davies. The “she” who first comes into view in line 3 may refer to “my 
spirit” in line 1 and not to the elusive “Lucy” after whom the five poems in the 
Lucy sequence have been named.6 In turn, one might ask, if “she” is not Lucy, do 
we need to think of the “I” as Wordsworth himself? While Keats would have said 
yes (as in his letter to Richard Woodhouse in October 18187), the textual surface of 
“Slumber” makes no such demand, and allows the reader to overrule biographical 
or psychoanalytical readings. Caraher goes on to critique Davies’s reading of the 
poem for “fail[ing] to take into account the surprise or shock that occurs in the 
second stanza of ‘A Slumber’ when the present-tense verbs alert a reader to a 
significant temporal displacement” (34). Yet it must be noted that, in disagreeing 
with Davies, Caraher actually draws a link between the “shock” and “non-shock” 
readings. In both camps, the critical finger invariably points at the juncture between 
the empty space separating the stanzas and the change in the poem’s grammar and 
diction. 
Richard Adelman has endorsed Caraher’s “masterful treatment of the 
poem’s syntax” to explain his own understanding of “Slumber,” the gap included. 
For him, the poem’s meaning is author-oriented as the playfully creative Romantic 
thought of Cowper and Coleridge — or “idle thought” (Adelman 101) — is 
redefined and transformed into something much more serious in Wordsworth: 
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Where Cowper and Coleridge portrayed the possibility of redefinition 
in the image of one object [creative thought as “a single fire or the idea of a 
gale”], “A Slumber” considers redefinition by death. . . . Wordsworth’s idle 
reverie passes beyond specific physical danger to categorically invoke 
death, and burial, as a physical reality. What was localized and therefore 
containable in Cowper and Coleridge, is rendered conceptual and universal 
by Wordsworth. (102) 
 
Turning to this “realm of philosophical gravity” (103) in which “Slumber” comes to 
represent “an examination of the dangers of idle thought” (104) rather than a playful 
fancy, Adelman places himself squarely in the “shock” position with Brooks, 
Bateson, and Caraher. The difference in perspective lies in the severity and scope of 
the threat posed. Whereas Brooks and Bateson deal with private loss and gain and 
Caraher with reader pragmatics, Adelman interprets the poem by dissolving its 
significance into the public. He releases the intermedial experience of “Slumber” 
from readings bound to the fate of the Lucy figure and the poetic I, and from the 
dreams of individual readers in general, and raises it to philosophical shock — 
death is the final state of idle thought for authors and readers alike. The near-cosmic 
terror of the second stanza overwhelms the personal distress of the first, enforced by 
the poem’s empty space. Adelman’s tone is certainly unsettling and adds further 
anxiety to most “shock” interpretations. 
 
“Non-Shock” 
In “To Be a Thing” Rzepka wonders why no critic has endorsed Davies’s “carefully 
reasoned and supported argument” that there is no shock or transition from one 
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experience to another between the two stanzas of “Slumber” (57). In 1965, Davies 
interpreted the poem “as expressing a distinctive, trancelike state of mind” that 
makes the poet’s “observing ‘spirit’ and what it observes a single, transcendental 
unity” (Rzepka 56). However, says Rzepka, Davies was left unsupported in this 
reading. The reason for this, as noted by Caraher above, was that Davies overlooked 
the “significant temporal displacement” that takes place in the poem (Caraher 34). 
Why is the first stanza written in the past tense and the second in the present? For 
the “shock” critics, the poem obviously describes two separate experiences; they 
attempt to read them together and reconcile them in one way or another, according 
to their respective interpretive schemes (whether reader pragmatics or author-
oriented philosophy). But how can a poem that contains such a gap be said to 
describe an ongoing state of the mind? 
Rzepka’s answer is the suggestion that the shift in tense may mark a 
broadening of perspective on the original event, a realization of its true meaning. 
While time has indeed passed, he argues, it does not follow that the initial 
experience will have changed into a different one through shock. Instead, the initial 
experience has been developing into a more mature version of itself. Rzepka is not 
arguing that interpreting “Slumber” as an ongoing state means that the two points in 
time marked by the shift in tense are simultaneous but that the present experience 
being described (recollecting the past in the first stanza, meditating on the present in 
the second stanza) contains them both. For him, as it occurs, the overall effect is not 
one of “shock” but “non-shock,” and the intermedial experience afforded by the 
poem is reassuring rather than desperate. Rzepka’s idea is based on the 
Heideggerian terms of “thing” and “gathering.” In his vision of continuity, the 
“spirit” of “Slumber” is literally a thing gathered as the living material being of the 
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human body instead of its death or Cartesian imprisonment in the flesh. This signals 
an organic unity growing in awareness that exceeds dualistic boundaries.8 
Rzepka also touches on de Man’s treatment of “Slumber,” and at first it 
might appear that he is not siding with it. This is because de Man does not refute the 
Lucy reference and does not engage with Davies.9 However, one can argue that, as 
de Man understands Wordsworth as “one of the few poets who can write 
proleptically about their own death and speak, as it were, from beyond their own 
graves,” in de Man’s reading the pronoun “she” is “large enough to encompass 
Wordsworth as well” (de Man 225). In this poetry, according to de Man, the figure 
of the author imaginatively consists of all the deictic references made under its 
name, and so it does not matter (as Keats would have concurred) who apparently 
speaks because it is still Wordsworth’s voice that reverberates throughout the 
intermedial experience of “Slumber.” Consequently, as “the poem is written from 
the point of view of a unified self that fully recognizes a past condition as one of 
error and stands in a present that, however painful, sees things as they actually are” 
(ibid., 224), de Man’s interpretive position interestingly resembles Rzepka’s. It 
could be understood as one in which the shock of inevitable temporal progression 
matures into an uninterrupted experience of all-encompassing subjectivity. 
Wordsworth the poet, as the narrative self whose presence saturates everything he 
writes, resigns his own mortality to nature in order to see himself in all natural 
things, that is, in the “rocks, and stones, and trees” of “earth’s diurnal course.” For 
de Man and Rzepka alike, the poem describes an ongoing state of mind because its 
interpretation in this manner does not require the reconciliation of two separate 
experiences — there always is just the one experience. In transcending shock and 
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the finality of death, as well as the poem’s empty space, the two readers gain a 
sense of interpretive stability and subjective closure. 
 
Intermedial Experience and Ekphrasis 
I claimed in the beginning of this article that intermedial experience is not to be 
reduced to an interpretive position because with each interpretation — or narrative 
appropriation of the text by a reader — there always remains an excess of 
experience that is not part of any interpretation. What definition of experience can 
the reader then operate with, unless one is to admit defeat and regard excess as the 
unthinkable and unsayable “immediate” dimension of experience? Martin Jay has 
defined the concept of experience in the following way: 
 
“Experience,” we might say, is at the nodal point of the intersection 
between public language and private subjectivity, between expressible 
commonalities and the ineffability of the individual interior. [It is] 
something that has to be undergone or suffered rather than acquired 
vicariously. (Jay 2005: 6–7) 
 
According to Jay, experience takes place where the public (social and cultural 
language) and the private (speechless selfhood) meet, and it cannot be sustained 
second-hand, or through someone else undergoing it. Moreover, because any 
experience involves both the public and the private to some degree, there can be no 
exclusively public or private experiences at all. Indeed, because the ideas of “public 
language” and “private subjectivity” are linguistic constructions, they do not exist 
as such in their own separate realms but only in the tension between them. When 
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someone tells themselves “it is I who is having this experience,” they confirm their 
subject position as distinct from other positions and close off the experience into a 
private sphere. In the case of reading a literary text, doing so gives rise to individual 
interpretations — of “my” reading against any other. For Caraher, this is the point 
of any pragmatic effort to read and, in taking sides, what follows from this 
reduction of experience is the public rhetorical contest of conflicting interpretive 
positions. 
By contrast, I would argue that in the very act of thinking that “it is I who is 
having this experience” the reading self is no longer undergoing a private 
experience. In thinking about the experience, the private matter has already become 
a public abstraction assigned to an imaginary agency — that of the “I.” The reading 
is linguistically confiscated by an expressible commonality speaking in its name 
from the inside. There is nothing that one can do to avoid this happening. Whether 
one reads to produce the most convincing interpretation possible, professional or 
non-professional, or whether one reads to enjoy the text in the solitude of one’s 
innermost being, the linguistic confiscation has taken place. In this sense, 
academically theorizing about a text or experiencing it “raw,” without speech or 
critical prejudice, do not inherently differ from each other: they go through the 
same cognitive mechanism. 
What does my (possibly Hegelian) argument entail, in effect? If it is indeed 
true that the experiencing I is a mere placeholder for the experience being 
undergone, it follows that one cannot simply expect the involved self to explain, or 
refuse to explain, the experience. One must look at the means by which the 
intermedial experience specifically comes into being, that is, at the medium of the 
presentation. In the case of “Slumber,” the presenting medium is word. In reading 
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the poem, the word turns into the visual medium and, in the process, affects the 
reader’s intermedial experience in a medium-specific manner. The imagined visual 
images waver in and out of the reach of the poem’s different “I”s, through and 
across the gap — or, perhaps, the “nodal point” in Jay’s terms — between the two 
stanzas. The experience that the reader undergoes simultaneously, as it were, with 
the experience described in “Slumber” is intermedial in nature. When the words 
vanish into the poem’s empty space, the intermedial experience of reading the poem 
is disrupted and, once the words return in the second stanza, the reader must 
respond. How to verbalize this non-verbal excess? Was the poetic I transformed by 
the sudden disruption? Does the reading I even possess the authority to answer that 
question? The “shock” and “non-shock” readers of “Slumber” have endeavored to 
interpret the excess of their reading experiences to produce their own respective 
narratives. 
The rhetorical device of ekphrasis can help to clarify this process. Word is 
the specific medium of the presentation of Wordsworth’s poem, and, in most 
readings, its two key visual images have to do with dreaming about a “thing” (who 
or what is it — “she,” spirit, or Lucy?) and observing the “rocks, and stones, and 
trees” of “earth’s diurnal course.” If the reader gleans the words of “Slumber” as 
describing either a transformative or a transcendental experience for the poetic I, 
based on figurative transposition, in reading the poem one re-enacts the experience, 
sights the “thing” and the “rocks, and stones, and trees,” and interprets the visual 
images accordingly (“This is who ‘she’ is and what ‘earth’s diurnal course’ 
means”). In other words, as a result of one’s intermedial experience of poetry, one 
produces an ekphrasis that is conceived of as the public fruit of the reading I’s 
private labor. The reading I has successfully represented in words what the poem’s 
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images represented for the poetic I, or, perhaps, Wordsworth himself. Then again, 
even if the reader deflected any life-changing experience, “shock” or “non-shock,” 
for the poetic I beyond the textual surface of the poem, one was yet bound to 
produce an ekphrasis — the verbal representation of the reading I’s experience of 
what the poem’s images represented for us as the readers of “Slumber.” In this case, 
the end result might be pragmatic, but the intermedial process and cognitive 
mechanism that have given rise to it and have led to the result would remain 
unchanged. There is a sense of interpretive stability and subjective closure in how 
the poem’s meaning is perceived. 
If the reading process usually tends to pan out in such a way, what particular 
insight can one gain through an analysis based on intermedial experience and 
ekphrasis in Wordsworth’s “Slumber”? Reading the poem in this rhetorical fashion 
exposes the kind of significance readers have assigned to its key words turned into 
visual images; it also brings out the excess of intermedial experience that is not part 
of any interpretation. Ekphrasis is charged with an interpretive demand that is 
distinct from other rhetorical devices; it is geared toward the meaning of the visual 
image produced by the words read and, in turn, toward the matter of the narrative 
selves involved in the intermedial experience of poetry. 
An ekphrastic diagnostic borrowed from W. J. T. Mitchell will further 
demonstrate the merit of the exercise. In Picture Theory, Mitchell identifies “three 
phases or moments of realization” that are related to one’s fascination with 
imagined images (152). The first phase is “ekphrastic indifference,” or the 
realization that images conjured up by words will never be real in the manner of 
visual images: “A verbal representation cannot represent — that is, make present — 
its object in the same way a visual representation can” (ibid.). The second phase is 
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“ekphrastic hope,” or the moment when “the impossibility of ekphrasis is overcome 
in imagination or metaphor” (ibid.). It is the magical instant when one suddenly 
imagines that art and poetry are endowed with the power to make unreal images 
come into being, more real than reality itself, on a transcendental plane beyond the 
realities of this world.10 The third phase is “ekphrastic fear.” Here one encounters 
“the moment of resistance or counterdesire that occurs when we sense that the 
difference between the verbal and visual representation might collapse” (154). If the 
gap between the two media at odds with each other were ultimately bridged over, 
and the image became as one with the word, it might well turn out to be something 
one never wanted. In some Romantic cases, the consequences could be mild, such 
as spoiling the surprise or exhausting a mystery in the manner of Ann Radcliffe’s 
The Mysteries of Udolpho (1794), which returns the reader to the phase of 
indifference. In other cases, such as Shelley’s “Ozymandias” (1818), the mystery is 
suspended in timeless desolation, whereas in Keats’s “Ode to a Nightingale” 
(1819), the desire to transcend mundane life brings about a last-minute jerk back 
into reality.  Then again, the consequences could, at their worst, result in the kind of 
visionary insanity epitomized by the strange old sailor of Coleridge’s The Rime of 
the Ancient Mariner (1798). 
If one uses Mitchell’s method to make sense of “Slumber” and considers 
some of the poem’s previous readings from either camp, it could be argued that 
Caraher’s pragmatic approach is well in line with the first phase, that of ekphrastic 
indifference. “Slumber” is simply a poem to be interpreted in the reader’s context, 
contingent on changing cultural conditions, not on any meaning hidden deep in or 
between the verses. Then again, it can be confidently argued that even if many 
“shock” and “non-shock” readers of “Slumber” differ excessively in their takes on 
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the empty space between the poem’s two stanzas, they do so in the ekphrastic hope 
of uniting the poem’s words with its images. Regardless of interpretive camp, this 
hope is particularly pronounced in Bateson with his celebration of nature’s glory, 
and in Davies with his vision of transcendental oneness. It could also be claimed 
that although Brooks stresses the terrifying experience of the poetic I, his is still a 
hopeful reading of agonistic heroism, and it is not wrong to say that Rzepka, in his 
Heideggerian gathering of the poem as organic awareness, yields high hopes for its 
future. 
The two readings in which I find analogies to ekphrastic fear are Adelman’s 
and de Man’s. Because Adelman interprets “Slumber” in a manner that tears it 
away from the individual reader, dissolving its significance into the public, the 
universal death implied by Wordsworth as understood by Adelman is frightening 
enough to make the reader want to look away from the poem, to separate the words 
from the images and reassert the gap. Of course, one could argue that Adelman’s 
nihilistic reading of near-cosmic terror is, indeed, only the reverse of Davies’s 
transcendental vision. However, the difference between them in terms of the three 
phases of ekphrasis is that whereas Adelman, unlike Davies, is recommending 
active philosophical caution, or skepticism. Davies seems to dive into the dreamy 
reverie of “Slumber” headlong. 
Then again, although de Man seems to support the view that the poem 
conveys an uninterrupted experience of all-encompassing subjectivity — and also 
the idea that, in a deadly fashion, the author Wordsworth succeeds in what he sets 
out to do — the reader never enjoys the same privilege. It comes at too high a cost. 
Across the poem’s empty space, the reader remains at a distance from all the figures 
involved, Wordsworth, the poetic I, the enigmatic “she.” Whereas for de Man the 
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author falls prey to his own imaginings, and writes from beyond death, the reader 
avoids such fate, remaining outside the poem. The reading I realizes that one is 
forever separate from the poetic I — that the words and images experienced by one 
figure will not match the words and images experienced by another figure, real or 
imagined. The desire for shared experience remains, however. If Wordsworth could 
have it, why could not I? Beyond the comfort of conflicting but stable interpretive 
positions afforded by other readers, the intermedial experience of this urge harasses 
the reader with excessive promises that go unfulfilled, while at the same time it 
disrupts the sense of subjective closure and maintains an ongoing loop of ekphrastic 
phases. 
 
Twisting the Image 
When intermedial experience resists reduction to an interpretive position, the 
process of reading is brought into focus, and the reader becomes involved with the 
excess of their reading experience and can note the means by which the intermedial 
experience of poetry comes into being. As I have argued, study of the workings of 
ekphrasis helps us to understand how reading as intermedial experience both 
maintains and disrupts the sense of subjective closure, the sense of “my” reading 
against any other, and how it may fare in the public rhetorical contest of conflicting 
interpretive positions. The matter of the narrative selves involved in the medium-
specific environment of Wordsworth’s verbal art comes into focus. 
Ekphrasis aside, Mark Jones has expressed a similar thought about the long 
catalogue of responses to the Lucy poems: 
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[H]ow and why does [Wordsworth’s] poetry create the complexities 
that seem to demand simplification? And how and why do critics repress 
this complexity — that is, not only in interpreting, but also in denying the 
extent to which the poetry demands interpreting in the first place? (97) 
 
Jones claims that the theoretical frames within which the Lucy poems have been 
interpreted have operated from “predictable institutional categories” (98), foregoing 
and containing the peculiar intricacy of Wordsworth’s work. As his own 
contribution, Jones stresses the “dialectical romantic symbol” as the key figure by 
which the reading could be done differently: “The romantic symbol may be a 
medium of knowledge, but it is not a pure medium; its core of being leaves an 
untranslatable remainder; it resists full and definitive appropriation” (102). This 
 “untranslatable remainder” is not dissimilar to the excess of experience that I have 
discussed in this article, when poetic imagery as “a medium of knowledge” is 
equated with interpretation as a narrative appropriation of the text. Jones does not 
explore the theory of the Romantic symbol extensively, but it is surely an avenue 
that warrants inquiry — as Murray Krieger has demonstrated in Ekphrasis: The 
Illusion of the Natural Sign. I conclude by revisiting two of Krieger’s key ideas, 
with the twist to intermedial experience. 
For Krieger, “to look into ekphrasis is to look into illusionary representation 
of the unrepresentable” (xv). The premise fits Jones’s understanding of the 
Romantic symbol. As Wordsworth’s Lucy is “properly reducible neither to material 
human being nor to idea,” she remains “essentially unknowable” (102) and, in 
effect, unrepresentable except through ekphrastic illusion, as Krieger might say. 
The gap appears unbridgeable. And although ekphrasis gives no direct access to 
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knowledge or immediate nature, Krieger notes that in reading there is no way 
around it: 
 
we must stay with the poem and with the imagined object it inspires in us, 
since  its supposed object of imitation is only that imagined object. It is our 
unattainable dream of a total verbal form, a tangible verbal space. We may 
see it as the poem’s miracle, and that seeing is our mirage. (xvii) 
 
Krieger, in other words, has “ekphrastic hope” – for him, too, “the impossibility of 
ekphrasis is overcome in imagination or metaphor” (Mitchell 152). The reader’s 
intermedial experience of the poem’s “miracle” may be tempered with the 
indifferent knowledge that it is only a “mirage,” but the fact does not diminish the 
power of the illusion. Because even if the gap appeared unbridgeable, it would not 
stop the reader from imagining otherwise. The “shock” and “non-shock” readings 
of “Slumber,” with their varying views on the public or private consequences of the 
poem’s meaning, are evidence for this. 
Poetic imagery such as the elusive Lucy figure — as memorable a Romantic 
symbol as ever was — points to the source of Krieger’s “unattainable dream.” Yet 
his dream fails to recognize that whatever appears as Lucy might not be Lucy at all. 
The identification is soothing and empowering but textually ungrounded. One may 
discount the Lucy theory in the context of “Slumber,” as many readers from Davies 
onwards have done. Yet what does remain if the reader lets go of the Lucy dream? 
What happens to the intermedial experience of poetry if the reader has no narrative 
self to assume the main role in “Slumber”? 
 
 
 20 
What remains, in my reading, is the harsh miracle of Romantic introspection 
pushed too far, into the empty space between the two stanzas, where the reading I 
dare not follow the poetic I. Ekphrastic fear affects the intermedial experience of 
sheer excess that is Krieger’s illusion. Both the hope of unity and wisdom and the 
anxiety of universal death are only promised in the form of their repeated 
disruption. The poem’s visual imagery is twisted not by indifferent knowledge 
(“these are only images in a poem”), but by the reader’s failure (“I do not know 
why I keep seeing the images”) to control it. Just as the “rocks, and stones, and 
trees” roll round in “earth’s diurnal course,” what is read keeps turning into what is 
seen, the seen back into the read — and there is nothing shocking about that. The 
ongoing shock is the reader’s intermedial experience of being unable to maintain a 
sense of interpretive stability and subjective closure except through comforting 
illusion or the premonition of death. 
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